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THE CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 
Fred L. Morrison* 
The new constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina is clearly a transitional document. It is, of course, the 
product of civil war, of "ethnic cleansing," and of (well justified) 
mutual mistrust. It was created as part of the peace package ne-
gotiated at Dayton in November 1995 and accepted by the two 
constituent "Entities" (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, and the Republic of Srpska) and by the central government 
as the new constitution of the internationally recognized Repub-
lic. It is the second new constitution to be negotiated with inter-
national assistance and encouragement in the course of the 
recent hostilities; the first, as amended, now serves as the consti-
tution of the Federation which forms one half of the Republic.! 
This new Bosnian constitution makes the American Articles 
of Confederation of two centuries ago look like a centralized, 
unitary form of government. It distributes almost all governmen-
tal authority to the two "Entities," the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (in the territory controlled by the former Croat and 
Muslim government) and the Republic of Srpska (in the territory 
formerly controlled by the Bosnian Serbs), and then effectively 
disables the central government from exercising the few powers 
given to it. It thus combines a "minimalist" approach to national 
government with a "maximalist" approach to checks and bal-
ances. The central government of the new Bosnia has very few 
competences and these can be exercised only with acquiescence 
of all parties. The constitution is only one of 12 annexes to the 
General Framework Agreement on peace in the area. Some of 
the other annexes also have constitutional dimensions and will be 
discussed here. The protection of human rights, the restoration 
of the infrastructure, and the settlement of disputes between the 
Entities are all subjects of separate agreements outside of the 
constitution itself. 
* Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
I. 33 I.L.M. 740 (1994). 
145 
146 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:145 
The level of distrust evidenced by the instrument is illus-
trated by the heavy reliance on "outsiders," i.e., on persons from 
outside of the former Yugoslavia, to provide many of the leader-
ship functions of the new government by providing the neutral 
tie-breaking vote in many important governmental institutions. 
BACKGROUND 
A brief word of history is necessary, if only to identify the 
players. The former Yugoslavia was nominally a federation of six 
republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the days of Tito, the federation op-
erated with an amazing uniformity, at first because of the per-
sonal influence of Tito, and later because of the unifying role of 
the Communist Party. With the collapse of the communist bloc, 
it flew apart. Slovenia quickly became an independent republic, 
and Croatia followed soon thereafter. Macedonia also became 
independent, but engaged in endless squabbles with Greece over 
its name; it is now known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. Serbia and Montenegro continued a quasi-federal 
existence, internationally recognized under the name Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro).2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most multi-
ethnic of the nations, collapsed into its civil war. 
There were really three parties to that conflict: the Bosnian 
Serbs. who were initially supported by Serbia, i.e., by Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro); the Bosnian Croats, who were initially 
supported by Croatia, but soon came to ally themselves with the 
Moslems, and the Bosnian Moslems. who had the leadership of 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina government. (There was also another 
small group, called simply "Others," who were caught in the mid-
dle of all of this, and who considered themselves only citizens of 
the region, without ethnic allegiance.3 In this group were some 
individuals of Italian extraction. some Jews. and some mixed 
families.) 
In 1994, under the aegis of the Vance-Owen peace talks, a 
constitution was worked out for the portions of Bosnia-Herzego-
2. None of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia has inherited its interna-
tional recognition. The Arbitration Commission established by the Conference for Peace 
in Yugoslavia ruled that the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been 
dissolved and that all of the successors were new states. Opinion No. 9, reprinted in 31 
I.L.M. 1523 (1992). Most other international organizations have followed suit. Thus all of 
the former Yugoslav republics are on an equal footing in international law. This does 
create some difficulties with respect to succession to treaty rights and obligations. 
3. The "Others" were specifically recognized in the constitution of the Federation, 
but are not recognized as a separate group in the constitution of the Republic. 
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vina then controlled by the Bosnian government. This called for 
a cantonalization of those portions of the country under Croat-
Moslem control into fairly autonomous provinces, with executive 
and legislative bodies representative of the two groups. That 
constitution explicitly recognized that the Serbian controlled ar-
eas would establish their own framework of government. Main-
taining the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and providing 
protection for human rights remained national aims. The Serbs, 
however, formed the Republic of Srpska, with an apparent view 
to its eventual unification with Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). 
THE CONSTITUTION 
The Dayton Peace Accords sought to end the ethnic fighting 
by providing fixed boundaries between the two warring factions. 
Annex 4 to the Framework Agreement contains the text of the 
new constitution.4 It preserves the pretense of a single Bosnia-
Herzegovina by establishing a national government overarching 
the actual regimes of the two "Entities" (or States) within it.s 
One of these was the old Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(in the territory controlled by the Muslims and Croats); the other 
was the Republic of Srpska. Note the linguistic anomaly: the 
federal or central government is called the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, while the State or "Entity" government is 
called the Federation. 
The weakness of the new Republic is seen most clearly in 
the allocation of powers between the central and Entity levels. 
The central government is responsible for foreign affairs, foreign 
trade, and currency matters. Virtually everything else-courts, 
police, ordinary legislation, local government, education, and 
even military affairs-is left to the two Entity governments. The 
full list of powers allocated to the central government is set forth 
in Article III of the new constitution: 
The following matters are the responsibility of the institu-
tions of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
(a) Foreign policy. 
(b) Foreign trade policy. 
(c) Customs policy. 
(d) Monetary policy as provided in Article VII. 
4. The entire Dayton Accords are reproduced at 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996). The Consti-
tution can be found in id. at 117. 
5. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. I, § 3. 
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(e) Finances of the institutions and for the international 
obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(f) Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and 
regulation. 
(g) International and inter-Entity criminal law enforce-
ment, including relations with Interpol. 
(h) Establishment and operation of common and interna-
tional communications facilities. 
(i) Regulation of inter-Entity transportation. 
U) Air traffic controJ.6 
Even within these areas, the choices of the central government 
are strictly limited. For the first six year period, the constitution 
prohibits the new central bank from "creating money."? 
The central government is organized on a federalist 
scheme-but one driven to an extreme of states' rights. Every-
thing is apportioned in thirds-one part Serbian, one part Bos-
niac,s and one part Croatian. The Presidency consists of three 
individuals, one from each group.9 The bicameral legislature 
consists of an upper house (House of Peoples) with five from 
each group, and a lower house (House of Representatives) with 
fourteen from each group. Each of these bodies is to have three 
presiding officers who rotate in office.to 
The checks and balances are honed to a fine degree. The 
three-member Presidency is supposed to act by consensus.ll If 
that fails, two members may adopt a decision, but the dissenting 
member may then declare that decision "destructive of a vital 
interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was 
elected. "12 In that case, the matter is referred to the legislature 
of the ethnic group from which the dissenting member of the 
Presidency was elected.t3 If they uphold "their" member of the 
Presidency by a two-thirds vote, the challenged action does not 
take effect.14 
6. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. III, § 1. 
7. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VII, § 1. 
8. The Constitution refers to citizens of Bosnian extraction as "Bosniacs." See, 
e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V, § 2(d). 
9. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V. 
10. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 3(b). 
11. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V, § 2(c). 
12. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V, § 2(d). 
13. In the case of Srpska, this is its National Assembly; in the case of the Bosniac 
and Croat members, it is the members of the upper house of the Federation who are of 
that ethnic group. ld. 
14. !d. 
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The most ominous evidence of the divisions that remain 
within the troubled country is to be seen in the provisions relat-
ing to the armed forces. With respect to most civilian matters, 
the Presidency acts by consensus. With respect to military issues, 
however, the Constitution provides: "Each member of the Presi-
dency shall, by virtue of the office, have civilian command au-
thority over armed forces."Ls Clearly, the constitution writers 
could not ignore the stark fact that each of the ethnic groups has 
its own military force, which will not be responsive to any single 
central authority. It may be one country, but it has (at least) 
three armies. 
In the legislative branch, the Parliamentary Assembly, there 
are similar checks and few balances. In the upper house, the 
House of the Peoples, a majority of each ethnic group must be 
present in order for there to be a quorum,t6 so a dissenting ethnic 
group could forestall action if three of its five members fail to 
attend sessions. In both houses, the presiding officers are sup-
posed to encourage decisions to be taken with a majority of each 
ethnic group concurring. Failing such broad support, a simple 
majority may take action, but if two-thirds of an ethnic group 
opposes the legislation, it does not take effect.n 
There is still another "ethnic veto." A majority of the five 
members of the upper house from any one of the ethnic groups 
may declare a proposed decision of the legislature to be "destruc-
tive of a vital interest" of that ethnic group. Such a declaration 
then requires the votes in the upper house to be taken separately; 
a majority of each of the three ethnic "caucuses" is necessary for 
passage. (If a majority of an ethnic group has already identified 
the decision as "destructive," it seems unlikely that a majority of 
that same group will vote for the legislation.) If one of the other 
ethnic caucuses objects to the declaration, the declaration is first 
referred to a joint committee and then to the Constitutional 
Court, "which shall in an expedited process review it for proce-
dural regularity."Ls Note that only the procedure of making the 
declaration, not its substance, is subject to judicial review. 
The legislative body is, however, a relatively powerless insti-
tution. Since most of the powers of the central government are 
in those fields that are essentially executive, there is little for the 
15. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. V, § 5(a). 
16. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. IV, § 1(b). 
17. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. IV,§ 3(d). 
18. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. IV,§§ 3(e), (f). 
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parliament to do. Under Article IV, section 4 of the Constitu-
tion, the powers of the Parliamentary Assembly are limited to: 
(a) Enacting legislation as necessary to implement deci-
sions of the Presidency or to carry out the responsibilities of 
the Assembly under this Constitution. 
(b) Deciding upon the sources and amounts of revenues 
for the operations of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(c) Approving a budget for the institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
(d) Deciding whether to consent to the ratification of 
treaties. 
(e) Such other matters as are necessary to carry out its 
duties or as are assigned to it by mutual agreement of the 
Entities.I9 
Even these powers are circumscribed by other parts of the consti-
tution. For example, if the Parliamentary Assembly fails to pass 
a budget, the budget from the previous year continues in effect.2o 
(The government of Bosnia may have little power, but the au-
thors of the constitution, sitting in Dayton during a period of 
shutdown of the United States government, were aware of the 
possibility of even further stalemate.) Although the national 
government may collect taxes (e.g., the customs duties provided 
under its authority), it is expected that the bulk of national reve-
nue will come from assessments on the two Entities. The Federa-
tion will contribute two-thirds and Srpska will contribute one-
third. With tight control of the purse strings, the two Entity gov-
ernments will be able to control central action. 
The structure of the Constitutional Court also demonstrates 
the delicate balancing of the situation. It will have nine mem-
bers, including two from each ethnic group (appointed by that 
group), and three foreign neutrals, appointed by the President of 
the European Court of Human Rights "after consultation with 
the Presidency."21 The Court will have very limited jurisdiction. 
It will have original jurisdiction in cases arising between the Enti-
ties, between the Entities and the central government, or be-
tween organs of the central government.22 It also will have 
appellate jurisdiction only over cases involving constitutional is-
19. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. IV,§ 4. 
20. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VIII, § 2. 
21. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI, § 1. 
22. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI, § 3(a). 
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sues.z3 In human rights cases, it will have jurisdiction on referral 
of legal questions from courts in either of the two Entities.z4 This 
distinction may be mischievous. The only direct right of access 
for a litigant will be in constitutional cases. In other "human 
rights" cases, the litigant will be forced to rely upon the willing-
ness of the local court to refer the matter to the Constitutional 
Court for its decision. Because human rights issues are funda-
mentally interwoven into the constitution, it may be possible for 
litigants to characterize them as involving constitutional issues. 
Other than the Constitutional Court, there is no provision for a 
federal judiciary. 
Several other provisions of the constitution deserve special 
note, including the protection of human rights, the provisions 
permitting the two Entities to enter into agreements with neigh-
boring states, and the effort to exclude the greatest offenders of 
the war from political leadership positions. The intense commit-
ment to human rights, both within the constitution and in the 
other agreements that are part of the Dayton accords, is dis-
cussed separately below. 
One unusual provision permits each of the Entities to "es-
tablish special parallel relationships with neighboring states con-
sistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina."zs Unlike most national constitutions, which nor-
mally forbid or limit their States from entering into foreign com-
pacts, this document specifically authorizes such agreements. 
This will primarily permit Srpska to enter into various arrange-
ments with neighboring Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
without violating either the Accords or the constitution. A grad-
ual absorption of many governmental services into the ambit of 
Belgrade is to be expected, since only foreign affairs and foreign 
trade are effectively within the scope of powers exercised by the 
central government and thus excluded from the parallel arrange-
ments. Disputes about whether a "special parallel relationship" 
violates these standards may be decided by the Constitutional 
Court.26 
23. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI, § 3(b). 
24. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI,§ 3(c). The relationship between the Con-
stitutional Court and the Human Rights Chamber, created by a separate annex to the 
Dayton peace settlement, remains unclear. 
25. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. III, § 2(a). 
26. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. VI,§ 3(a). 
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The world has been appalled by the violations of human 
rights in the Former Yugoslavia. The Dayton Agreements ad-
dress this issue in two ways. Human rights are the subject of Ar-
ticle II of the constitution. An institutional framework for 
dealing with human rights issues is also spelled out fully in a sep-
arate agreement, which is Annex 6 of the Accords. The constitu-
tion also contains provisions prohibiting discrimination27 and 
protecting refugees.2s 
Although the constitution contains a catalog of human rights 
to be protected by the Republic,29 the most interesting provision 
is the adoption of human rights norms by reference: "The rights 
and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These 
shall have priority over all other law."3o This has the effect of 
incorporating the highly developed law of the European Conven-
tion, as developed by the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, directly into the Bosnian 
constitution, making it the supreme law of the land. Such a noble 
aspiration is to be applauded. Bringing it to realization will be 
the more difficult task. 
The constitution also requires the national government to 
become (or remain) a party to fifteen listed international human 
rights agreements. These include the Genocide Convention, the 
Geneva Conventions (including the protocols protecting persons 
in times of internal war), the United Nations Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and European and international conventions on the pro-
tection of minorities.31 
Separate from the constitution, but referred to in it,32 the 
central government and the two Entities entered into an Agree-
ment on Human Rights.33 It not only contains a list of rights 
parallel to that in the constitution, but also establishes a series of 
mechanisms to enforce them. There are an Ombudsman and a 
27. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 4. 
28. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 5. 
29. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 3. 
30. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 2. 
31. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 7, and Annex I to the Constitution. 
32. Bosnia-Herzegovina Const., Art. II, § 1. 
33. Annex 6 to the Dayton Accords, 35 I.L.M. 130 (1996) ("Human Rights 
Agreement"). 
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Human Rights Chamber.34 These bodies are responsible for con-
sidering alleged violations of the provisions of the European 
Convention as well as alleged discrimination by official action.3s 
In the initial stages, the Ombudsman will be an individual from 
outside of the geographic area, to be appointed by the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Hel-
sinki Declaration organization.36 The Ombudsman's function is 
to investigate (both on the basis of allegations and on the basis of 
apparent violations) as well as to make reports.37 Enforcement 
functions are, however, limited to forwarding reports to the vari-
ous parties or initiating proceedings in the Human Rights 
Chamber.3B 
The Human Rights Chamber is to be composed of fourteen 
members, but normally acts in two chambers of seven members 
each.39 There will be two Croats, two Bosniacs, and two Serbs, 
each appointed by their own governments,4o and eight outside 
members, appointed by the Committee of Ministers of the Coun-
cil of Europe, the Strasbourg organization.4I Each seven mem-
ber chamber will thus consist of three members from the ethnic 
groups and four outsiders. It has jurisdiction to review com-
plaints filed by individuals or by the Ombudsman and may issue 
decisions that are binding on any of the governments.4z After 
five years, at the end of the year 2000. administration of the 
human rights machinery will revert to the central government, 
unless the parties otherwise agree.43 
Another side agreement, Annex 7 to the Accords, estab-
lishes a regime for refugees.44 Under that agreement, refugees 
and displaced persons have the right to return to their homes 
where they are entitled to protection by the local authorities, 
even if they are _members of the minority. They are entitled to a 
general amnesty for all crimes connected with the conflict, except 
those defined as "serious violation[ s] of international humanita-
34. Human Rights Agreement, Art. II,§ 1. 
35. Human Rights Agreement, Art. II, § 2. 
36. Human Rights Agreement, Art. IV, § 2. 
37. Human Rights Agreement, Art. V. 
38. Human Rights Agreement, Art. V, § 7. 
39. Human Rights Agreement, Art. VII, § 1; Art. X, § 2. 
40. The two Croat and two Bosniac members will be appointed by the Federation; 
the two Serb members by Srpska. Human Rights Agreement, Art. VII, § 2. 
41. Human Rights Agreement, Art. VII, § 2. 
42. Human Rights Agreement, Art. XI, §§ 3, 6. 
43. Human Rights Agreement, Art. XIV. 
44. Annex 7 to the Dayton Accords, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996) ("Agreement on Refugees 
and Displaced Persons"). 
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rian law" by the Statute of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal.45 
Again the issue will be supervised by a commission, consisting of 
six representatives of the three conflicting factions and three ap-
pointed by the President of the European Court of Human 
Rights.46 
OTHER SIDE AGREEMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 
The constitution is, of course, part of a package-the Day-
ton Accords. Unlike the basic agreement, which is signed by the 
three internationally recognized governments, the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e., the central government), Croatia, 
and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the constitution was 
"accepted" by the two Entities, Srpska, and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The whole package, however, contains additional elements 
of a constitutional character. Annex 5 of the Agreement com-
mits the two Entities to arbitration of disputes between them.47 
No details are provided, but presumably this is separate and in-
dependent of any reference of these disputes to the Constitu-
tional Court. Again, this is a sign of the expected weakness of 
the institutions of the new national government. 
Annex 9 creates a commission to establish joint public cor-
porations of the two Entities to operate such activities as rail-
roads and communications facilities.48 The fragility of the 
situation is underscored by the fact that this task was not given to 
the central government, but rather to a joint venture of the two 
Entities, to be presided over by a neutral chair selected by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.49 Indeed, 
the central government is not even a party to the instrument cre-
ating this commission; it will be run by the two Entities and the 
neutral overseers without central participation. It is to establish 
a transportation corporation and may establish other public cor-
porations for services such as posts and communications.so 
45. Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Art. VI. 
46. Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Art. IX, § 1. 
47. 35 I.L.M. 129 (1996). 
48. 35 I.L.M. 144 (1996) ("Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Public Corporations"). 
49. Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, 
Art. I, § 2. 
50. Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, 
Art. II, § 1; Art. 3. 
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Another separate agreement establishes a Commission to 
Preserve National Monuments.s1 Here again, two members will 
come from the Federation, one from Srpska, and two will be ap-
pointed by the Director-General of UNESCO.s2 
CONCLUSIONS 
The constitution and its accompanying documents confirm 
the fragility of the situation and the difficulties that confronted 
the negotiators who set forth to create a peace settlement. Sev-
eral factors deserve special notice. 
The consistent pattern of checks and balances has created a 
system in which unanimous agreement of the three factions is 
necessary for any governmental action at the central level. This 
is no "Connecticut compromise" in which there is a balancing of 
power. Each of the Entities possesses a virtually absolute veto 
over the activities of the central government. This may have pro-
duced a consensus within the time limits available for settlement 
in Dayton, but it is hardly auspicious for the functioning of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina as a modern national state. 
In light of the weakness of the central government, the pro-
vision for cooperation agreements with neighboring states is a 
thinly disguised effort to make it possible for the Republic of 
Srpska to achieve most of the elements of its war aims, including 
unification with Serbia, while preserving the identity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a national state as a legal fiction. Indeed, it may 
be an incentive for the Croat-dominated sections of the Federa-
tion to seek similar arrangements with Croatia. In short, the idea 
of a single Bosnia won on paper, but not in reality. This decision 
may have significant consequences in other ethnic conflicts, be-
cause it may provide some evidence that ethnic separatists can 
get most of what they want. 
The multiple mechanisms that call for the appointment of 
the controlling members of important national institutions to be 
foreigners, selected by foreigners, reemphasize the absence of 
national unity. Table I indicates their positions and the ap-
pointing authorities. The list of appointing authorities also em-
phasizes the number of public international organizations that 
have become involved in the attempt to settle the problem. Each 
seems to have obtained a responsibility for management of some 
part of the troubled life of Bosnia for five years, or perhaps 
51. Annex 8, 35 I.L.M. 141 (1966) ("National Monuments"). 
52. National Monuments, Art. II, § 1. 
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TABLE I 
Membership on Bosnian Foreign 
Governmental Bodies Members 
Institution Bos. Croat. Serb. Foreign Appointed By 




Central Bank 1* 1* 1 1 International 
Governors Monetary Fund 







Human Rights 2** 2** 2 8 Committee of 
Chamber Ministers of 
the Council of 
Europe 
Commission for 2** 2** 2 3 President, 
Displaced Persons European 
and Refugees Court of 
Human Rights 
Commission to 1 1 1 2 Director-
Preserve National General, 
Monuments UNESCO 
Commission on 1 1 1 2 President. 





* The Bosniac and Croat members each have one-half vote; the foreign 
member has an additional tie-breaking vote. 
** Technically the Federation names 4; an even split between Bosniac and 
Croatians is assumed. 
more. These are in addition to the roles of NATO in preserving 
the peace, and of the United Nations High Representative in co-
ordinating the other activities of international organizations in 
rebuilding the country.s3 Most of these transitional arrange-
ments are for a five year period. They will expire in December 
53. Annex 10, 35 I.L.M. 146 (1996). 
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2000. At that time, the central government of the Republic is 
supposed to assume responsibility for the appointment of mem-
bers of these public bodies, unless all of the parties agree other-
wise. Although the first real test of the viability of this 
arrangement will come shortly after the NATO peacekeepers de-
part in late 1996, another test of the success of the constitution 
will come when the central government is to take over these gov-
ernmental responsibilities from the foreign intervenors. If the 
healing process has been thorough, the central authorities may 
be able to resume many of these functions. If it has been only 
adequate, the parties may agree to continue the foreign adminis-
trations of these functions for a few years into the future. If it 
has failed, there may be partition or even renewal of the 
hostilities. 
These arrangements may be situation-specific, but they may 
have a more general significance. Nation states, which once as-
serted an exclusivity of their internal administrative apparatus 
and a virtually unconditional requirement that their governors 
also be their citizens, may be undergoing radical transformation. 
For virtually all Europeans. the participation of the regional Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in deciding the validity of na-
tional actions is commonplace. For those in the European 
Union, participation of that organization in planning the eco-
nomic policy of the country, with a broader perspective in mind, 
is also an accepted derogation from stronger forms of traditional 
sovereignty. We may be entering a time in which the geographic 
nation state no longer has the exclusivity of governing power that 
it once claimed. With that change, constitutions may become in-
creasingly complex. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be a troubled place. Its 
peace is held together by a military presence from NATO that is 
monitoring the lines between the two Entities that form the na-
tion. An international police task force is providing additional 
enforcement.s4 The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina is thus 
clearly a transitional document. Like the Articles of Confedera-
tion of the United States, it is too weak to maintain a long lasting 
nation state. Whether the transition is toward a more effective 
constitutional structure in which a community will emerge, or to-
ward a more formal dismemberment cannot be answered yet. It 
is clear, however, that the constitution produces a much looser 
confederation than that of any other geographic unit that pur-
ports to be a single nation state. 
54. Annex 11, 35 I.L.M. 149 (1996). 
